Operation Wilderness – March 31 to April12, 1968
On April 1st, the battalion conducts an air mobile flight west from FSB Hampton to XT305308 (map coordinates) where we join up with D Troop 3rd Bn. 17th Mech. Infantry unit and begin to conduct RIF sweeps in surrounding area. There appears to be enemy activity in the area. We are now 14 miles south of Tay Ninh base camp, 2700 meters south of the Vam Co Dong River with Cambodia lying to our southwest.
From Elmer Lightner, 1st. Plt. C Co. 2/12th “It was the first of April when we got there and I know the ground was so hard we couldn't even dig in. I was on the 1st platoon ambush that made the initial contact the first night. The ambush leader that night was Sgt. Cook and the two guys on the M60 were Duke and Perry (can't recall their first names). Our machine gunner shot two when we were pulling out of the ambush site. I'll never forget the site of those tracer rounds going through those VC in the dark, it really made my stomach feel funny. We knew there were lots more from what we had seen and heard through the night but I don't think anyone had any idea just how many there were.”
According to Andy Wahrenbrock, 2nd platoon Medic and notes from his diary, we were in a different laager each night. The division sent in a “night kit” and supplies via CH-47A Chinook helicopter. The 269th Combat Aviation Battalion, 242nd Assault Support Helicopter Company, “Muleskinners” are our life line to Cu Chi and our Division base came. They are flying in our night kit which is comprised of rolls of concertina wire and claymore mines. Most of the time, we would also have hot meals flown in along with a water trailer. The hot meals were in thermos like containers called Mermacs about the size of a medium suitcase. Each container had one item, meat, potatoes, vegetables and ice tea or cool aid. Ice was a hot commodity, and drinks served cold, took precedent over everything.
The grunts (troops) were usually feed one platoon at a time. We needed to make sure we were not bunched up as we waited in the chow line. Troops commingling and gathered in groups always spelled disaster. All it took was one well placed mortar round and you take out a whole platoon.
Our C.O. 1LT Jay L. Hickey would usually have us move to our NL (night laager) site several hours before night fall so we could build our defensive positions. This meant needing time to place the wire, mines, trip flares etc. We did not always “dig in” as in creating foxholes, but you did want to be below ground level in case of mortar attacks which were very common at night. And, if we were to get any type of probes into our lines of defense, you would want to be out of the way of flying bullets and RPG’s. If we were on the move, it also meant that we had to remove all of our equipment, pack it up and wait to have it flown out until we repeated this process later that day.
After getting our positions set up for the night and after we had chow, we took turns being on watch. Each shift lasted two hours and we all took turns at it, even the NCOs. As night fell, the sounds from the jungle surroundings played tricks on your mind. If you were never prone to hallucinating, the dark nights on enemy soil wasted little time playing with you. It never took long to have your senses pick up on the occasional “bloop, bloop, bloop” and hear someone shouting “incoming” as Charlie walked 82MM mortars through the laager site. Charlie was a pretty good gunner too. Most of the time, he rarely missed his target. We weren’t too bad either and if we happened to have our own mortar crew in the field with us, they could calculate Charlie’s position and return fire as fast as his incoming rounds exploded. It was a cat and mouse game between them.
On the 2nd, we were not too far from our previous camp and the same scenario for the 3rd. I do remember we were expecting to receive contact from the enemy. At night, we were using the artillery from a nearby FSB for harassing fire to keep the enemy from concentrating around our laager site
That night, the 3rd of April, Charlie Company sends out an ambush patrol from 1st platoon at dusk to set up at XT304302. They observe campfires and movement to their front, but the enemy does not venture out in their direction that night. At dawn around 0640 hrs, they break down their ambush site by removing the claymore mines and storing them that were set up, any trip flares that were put out, and policing the area to make sure nothing is left behind. As they start back to the command post (laager site) they spot 2 VC packing flashlights and quickly reestablish their ambush. When the VC get close, the M60 gunner cuts loose and drops the enemy. It is over in a flash. After the bodies are checked for documents, the AP returns to the night sight.
At 0800 hrs on the 4th, the order is given for the 2/12th to move out along with D Troop. Charlie Co has the point and our azimuth is set for due south leaving from XT305306 in the direction of the ambush patrol. D Troop finds two military structures which it destroys at XT303298 at 0835 hrs. As the morning begins to pass by, we are moving through a swampy area with lots of tree cover. Up ahead to our front we spot two figures lying on top of what appears to be a bunker. The unit approaches with caution. There are 2 dead VC that had been hit by artillery fire possibly from the previous night. I remember standing there watching several G.I.’s going through their pockets looking for stuff and one guy took a watch and some money off of one of the bodies. They are wearing mixed uniforms, khaki shirts and black pajama bottoms. We recover one AK-47 rifle. It is now 0855 hrs and we are at XT303296
We continue on with our sweep working with the Mech’s and their APC’s. We are in a line formation. The APC’s were staggered about 50 feet apart. They move forward about 100 feet or so and stop. C Co, 2/12th is still on point and we are intermingled with the tracks, also in line formation. As the tracks stop moving, it allows us to catch up and then they tracks move forward again.
During this morning’s activities, I don’t remember separating myself from our gunner, but we must have. As I think about this year’s later, this was a cardinal sin. Our primary responsibility was to provide support for the machine gunner. Anyway, by us, I mean David Schultz and myself. I don’t remember how long we had been in this formation and how far we had advanced from our laager site. I’m guessing it could have been 1000 meters or so. Not a great distance at any rate. Suddenly, one of the track commanders stops and signals the rest of the tracks to stop. We have 8 APC’s on line at this point.
David and I made eye contact with the guy on the track and he signals us to come over. He indicated that he thought he had seen some movement in front of his track. The geography we had been going through consisted of areas of open grass and surrounded by trees and underbrush. At this point we were kind of “staged” behind a hedgerow, which was 10 meters in front of the tracks. Hedgerows can be trees, brush and bushes which create a makeshift fence line. This is often used to separate property lines. There was a road beyond the hedgerow that crossed in front of our unit’s formation. Beyond the road was a heavy tree line that stretched the width and beyond of our troops and tracks.
You can chalk up this next move to greenhorn experience. I felt somewhat giddy about the situation. I think I was still thinking about finding those bodies from the day before, and wanted to do a little of my own discover. Schultz and I were clearly not up to the task and out of position. We left our gunner, and wandered up past the APC’s and to their left. We stepped through a break in the hedgerow and walked up to the edge of the road, then onto it. To my right, was the road and I could see down it for several hundred meters. Directly to my front the road made a 90 degree turn and ran away from my position.
Schultz was standing to my right about 10 feet away and we were both surveying what was to our front. I glanced back to see what the rest of the company was doing. They seemed to be holding their positions, APC’s included. We must have been ahead of them by 40-50 feet. Suddenly, all hell broke loose. There were AK-47’s popping off and bullets were whizzing by me. I looked to the right to pick up the location of the fire as I drove for the ground. I see Schultz grabbing his midsection and then he went down hard and never moved. He took the initial burst from the small arms fire. We had walked up to an NVA battalion base camp.
At this point, there continued to be bursts of weapons fire everywhere. I could hear RPG’s being fired and explosions. The APC’s began to exchange fire as they opened up with their .50 Cal.’s and started to back away from the intense fire coming from the hedgerow across the road. I looked again to my right and could see a number of VC in bunkers firing to their front. I flicked the safety off of my M16 and unloaded a clip in their direction. I needed to crawl over to Schultz to see what I could do for him. He was still not moving nor talking. We were both carrying 200 rounds of 7.62 for the M60 plus our own equipment. Schulz was no small kid. I figured he had to weigh around 200 lbs and the equipment on him added another 30-40 lbs.
I tried to check David over for wounds. It was difficult considering I was trying to do this lying flat on the road surface. As I was feeling his body for life signs, I was receiving more ground fire from the tree line. Bullets are dancing on the ground toward me. I have no fire support and am lying with David on the road exposed to the enemy. My unit has pulled back. My gut reaction was that David was gone. I know he took it across the midsection from his right, probably through the liver and stomach. But I wanted to be sure. I tried to roll him over but had trouble doing that with his pack still on. I had another VC firing at me so I grabbed another clip and fired back. Schultz was still unresponsive. I reached around him one more time and as I was doing this, I was hit in the upper arm by an AK-47. That sealed the deal for me. I couldn’t drag Schultz to safety if I wanted to at that point. Not without the suppressing fire I needed in order to stand up and gain leverage. I stood no chance against those automatic weapons out in the open.
I had no choice in my mind, but to get help, in the hopes that Schultz was only unconscious and not gone. I didn’t want to leave him, but at this point, it was every man for himself. I stay there and maybe I’m dead in a few short minutes. If I stand to try and drag Schultz, I’m too easy a target for Charlie. So, I jumped up and sprinted back off the road and dove behind the hedgerow. I picked my way back toward the skirmish line we had set up. The fire was so intense that moving any of the troops or APC’s forward was not going to happen. I hear a continuous stream of RPG explosions and the crackling of AK-47’s. As I make my way past an APC, the tank commander is firing his .50 Cal machine toward the hedgerow to his front as his driver is slamming the APC into reverse. Another APC is burning, taking a direct hit from an RPG. The track commander is dead. We seem to be having trouble setting up a skirmish line to lay down a heavy base of fire at the enemy. I was able to find my platoon and gave a situation report to one of the NCO’s (non commissioned officers). I ask for help to retrieve Schultz, but he said it wasn’t possible. When he noticed that I was bleeding from my wound, he summed the medic.
I was ordered to remain there and await a dust off. While sitting there, the artillery begins to pour in on the tree line across the road. Soon, we have gun ships from A Troop, 3/17th providing support. Not long after that, a request is put in for close air support from Tan Son Nhut. The air force begins dropping napalm. Within ˝ hour or so, along with another guy from my platoon, Sgt John Spores, I was picked up by General F.K. Mearns, the division commander (photo right).
Apparently this dogfight was big enough for him to show up and see what was going on. I spoke to the General and another officer about what had happened on the ground after he asked to be briefed. I specifically told him about Schultz’s situation. He flew us to Cu Chi to the 12th Evacuation Hospital for medical treatment.). PFC Price, who arrived in country with me is also wounded and is evacuated after I am picked up. His wounds were superficial shrapnel wounds and looked worse than they were. He is treated and released.
According to Elmer Lightner, “I'm not sure just how many days the battle lasted but I know there was a lot of artillery and air support before it was over. After it was over we walked to a base camp that had been set up with a battery of 105's and I know A Co. 2/12th Inf. was guarding the guns. I'm sure of that because a buddy of mine was with A Co. and I looked for him when we got there only to find out he had been hit in a mortar attack a couple days earlier and dusted off.
I do know another unit came through behind us and found a bunch of weapons and stuff and I believe it was either the 198th or the 199th but I couldn’t say which.”
Back at Dau Tieng, after Sgt Spores and I had been bandaged up at 12th Medical Evacuation Hospital in Cu Chi, we awaited word of the battle. Over the radio we hear that Dr. Martin Luther King is assassinated. Checking in at the company HQ, we heard that air support and a heavy use of artillery were used. For several days we await to hear more. Schultz’s body was recovered on the 5th along with two other KIA’s from what I heard around 1150 hrs. He was listed as being killed by multiple fragmentation wounds. The units swept the area after the VC pulled out finding 4 VC KIA’s and blood trails for another 4 possible dead. In the afternoon they were airlifted to the west where the three companies set up in separate laager sites for the night. During that day, A Troop 3/17th as well as a team from F Co, 51st Inf. Long Range Patrol have spotted a lot of activity. The decision is made to go and investigate. A Troop spots 25 fresh gravesites west of our contact area. Could it be that the VC removed their dead and packed them several miles before they buried them? They are known to remove their dead from any battle site and do this sort of thing. Maybe we got more than the 8 credited kills from this engagement. I also remember this action being reported on TV back in the world and we had been engaging a NVA battalion and was credited with killing a hundred NVA. The funny thing about this whole episode is that there are no published records anywhere that I could find. There is no mention in Stars and Strips or in the Tropic Lightning News.
For the night of the 5th the new map coordinates for the unit is now XT208351 for Alpha Co; XT199279 for Bravo and D Troop; XT181290 for Charlie and Delta Co.’s. The units sweep the area on the 6th and on the 7th move from XT1829 to XT175293 where once again they reengage the enemy. We loose several more KIA’s in the process but get our revenge. The battalion remains in constant contact until the 9th of April. After this action, the 2/12th is returned to Dau Tieng, and the 199th LIB is released from the control of the 25th Div.
Excerpt from 25th Division daily journal
The 1st Brigade began TOAN THANG on 7 April 1968 with two maneuver battalions (4th Battalion, 9th Infantry, and 3rd Battalion, 22nd Infantry). The 2nd Brigade commenced the operation with four maneuver battalions: (1st Battalion, 27th Infantry; 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry; 1st Battalion 5th Infantry (Mech); and 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry). The 3rd Brigade operated with four battalions (2nd Battalion 22nd Infantry (Mech); 4th Battalion, 23rd Infantry (Mech); 2nd Battalion, 34th Armor; and 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry). The 199th Light Infantry Brigade continued under the operational control of the 25th Infantry Division beginning activities in TOAN THANG with three maneuver battalions: (3rd Battalion, 7th Infantry; 4th Battalion, 12th Infantry; and 2nd Battalion 12th Infantry).
On 7 April the 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry conducted a reconnaissance in force (RIF) from XT1829 to XT175293. At 1105 hours at the vicinity of XT178295, Company C received small arms, automatic weapon and RPC fire. The company returned fire with organic weapons and called in artillery and helicopter gunships. Nine enemy bodies were discovered following the action together with one AK-47 rifle and one carbine. The company received three wounded who were evacuated. At 1305, Company C located and destroyed 21,200 pounds of rice at XT175293.
On 8 April the 4th Battalion, 23rd Infantry (Mech) became OPCON to the 1st Brigade from 3rd Brigade. In the 2nd Brigade area, the 1st Battalion 27th Infantry conducted a cordon and search in the vicinity XT745072 and conducted a combat assault at XT787138. At 1345 hours in the vicinity XT792115 to 792118 Companies A and D captured 246 rounds of RPG-2 ammunition, 14 RPG-47 rounds, 305 60mm mortar rounds, 258 RPG boosters, 19 75mm RR rounds, 28,800 rounds of small arms ammunition, 1100 hand grenades and 1200 82mm mortar fuses. Also on 8 April, the battalion captured two pounds of documents, one AK-47 rifle and destroyed 500 pounds of sugar, 3690 pounds of rice and four sampans. The 3rd Battalion, 7th Infantry conducted a RIF from XT1729 to 179323. At 1445 hours at XT178296, companies A and D captured 32 Chi Com Carbines, one light machine gun, one Chi Com heavy machine gun and 25 pounds of documents. It also destroyed 15 bangalore torpedoes, one RPG-7 round, 8 claymores, 15 pounds of explosives, 1000 small arms rounds, one light anti-tank weapon (LAW) and 50 pounds of salt.
On 9 April, the 199 Light Infantry Brigade was released from OPCON to the 25th Infantry Division and returned to the control of II Field Force.
On 10 April, 2nd Battalion, 34th Armor passed to the operational control of the 1st Brigade from 3rd Brigade, and 3/22 Infantry passed from 1st Brigade to the 3rd Brigade. At 0950 vicinity XS725859 helicopter gunships from Company B, 25th Aviation Battalion supporting 2/27 Infantry engaged 11 VC in 5 sampans with automatic weapons fire. The 5 sampans were sunk and three enemy KIA were identified by body count.
On 11 April, the 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry became OPCON to the 3rd Brigade from the 199th Light Infantry Brigade.
Here are some notes from Medic Andy Wahenbrock’s diary about this time period.
“April 1st, "eagle flight to 2000 meters from the cam border no contact".
April 2nd " moved to new laager sight close to last one".
April 3rd "new laager sight".
April 4th " went into old village with B&C Co & mech. Hit heavy contact about 10. Stayed in heavy contact till around 4. 10 to 15 WIA's & 4 KIA's for B&C & mech. Worst fire fight yet".
April 5th " moved to new laager sight. Charlie was all around us. Shot two from B co right outside perm".
April 6th " Hit us with sniper fire & RPG’s & mortars around 5. Hit real close. Damn lucky. Stayed back. OP got 3 body count late that night".
April 7th " Hit again with snipers & rpg's around 4 in the morning. Moved out D&C Co. Luckiest day yet. Walked into a regimental size ambush 700 meters long. They sprung it to early & we really lucked out. They hit us with RPG's & 75mm recoiless mortors automatic weapons. No one injured bad. We put in 1800 arty & air strikes. Base camp about 900 meters long. Didn't get hit that night. 2 co's of 199 bde moved to our logar sight".
April 8th " Went back in. Hit a couple snipers. Two injured moved on through found some bodies & weapons etc & lots of bunkers. Sent in 6 heat cases. Started to rain around 7 or 8 start on monsoon. Haven't had a damn shower in 10 days now & I really stink. Our plt went from 23 to 16 in two days. Two WIA's & heat & odds & ends".
April 9th " got hit around 4 morn with 3 or 4 rpg's & a few sniper rounds. Moved through VC base camp to new logar"
---- As I mentioned, I was the medic in Charlie 2, from 1/15/68 - 5/23/68.”