2nd Bde TT2

Toan Thang II

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

HEADQUARTERS 2ND BRIGADE, 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION

APO 96225

AVDCSB-C 10 March 1969

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: MACJ3 K-1)

Commanding General

25th Infantry Division

ATTN: Division Historian

APO 96225

1. (U) Operation TOAN THANG, Phase II

2. (U) Dates of Operation: 010001 June 1968 - 162400 February 1969

3. (U) Location: Gia Dinh, Hau Nghia, Binh Duong, and Tay Ninh Provinces, RVN

4. (U) Control Headquarters: 2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division.

5. (U) Reporting Officer: Colonel H.S. Long Jr.

6. (C) Task Organization:

1st Battalion, 5th Infantry (M)

1st Battalion, 27th Infantry

2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry

2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry

2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry

3rd Battalion, 34th Cavalry

3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry

3rd Battalion, 22nd Infantry

3rd Battalion, 187th Infantry

4th Battalion, 9th Infantry

2nd Battalion, 3rd Infantry

3rd Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry

65th Engineer Battalion

GROUP - 4

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS

DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

AVDCSB-C 10 March 1969

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: MACJ3 K-1)

1st Battalion, 8th Artillery

C Battery, 7th Battalion, 11th Artillery

B and C Batteries, 2nd Battalion, 13th Artillery

3rd Battalion, 13th Artillery

B and C Batteries, 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery

B and C Batteries, 2nd Battalion, 77th Artillery

C Battery, 3rd Battalion, 197th Artillery

C Battery, 2nd Battalion, 319th Artillery

38th Scout Dog Platoon

7. (C) Supporting Forces:

a. Artillery Support.

(1) Units.

(a) Direct support: 1st Battalion, 8th Artillery fired in direct support of the 2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division.

(b) General support:

C Battery, 7th Battalion, 11th Artillery

B and C Batteries, 2nd Battalion, 13th Artillery

A, B, C and D Batteries, 3rd Battalion, 13th Artillery

B and C Batteries, 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery

B and C Batteries, 2nd Battalion, 77th Artillery

C Battery, 3rd Battalion, 197th Artillery

C Battery, 2nd Battalion, 319th Artillery

(2) Artillery was employed in Operation TOAN THANG, Phase II to provide:

(a) Landing zone preparations.

(b) Suppressive fires.

(d) Suppression of sniper fire.

(e) Destruction of attacking enemy forces (direct fire).

(f) H and I fires.

(g) Smoke and screening fires.

(h) Marking rounds for location

(i) Illumination.

(3) 309,744 rounds of 105mm, 155mm and 8 inch artillery were

fired in support of 2nd Brigade operations and Vietnamese units within the Brigade TAOI.

b. Army Aviation: The four (4) organic OH-23's were exchanged for four (4) OH-6A's. The aircraft were used on a daily basis by the battalions for command and control, liaison and reconnaissance missions. During the period, the aircraft flew a total of 3855 hours, consisting of 8040 tasks, 14,071 sorties and 14,018 passengers carried. The 25th Aviation Battalion provided a UH-1D command and control helicopter to the Brigade Commander. The Brigade Commander used the C&C extensively for controlling multi-battalion operations, making command visits, and observing tactical operations. The Brigade utilized one or more assault helicopter companies on 211 days of Operation TOAN THANG, Phase II. The helicopter companies were normally furnished by the 269th Combat Aviation Battalion. The assault helicopter companies were used primarily to conduct combat assault and eagle flights. CH-47's allocated daily by II Field Force, resupplied the battalion during Operation TOAN THANG, Phase II. A total of 1681 CH-47 sorties were utilized during the operation to move 1944 tons of Class I through V supplies, personnel and mail to the forward areas. UH-1D's performed several emergency resupply missions on a quick and timely basis.

c. Air Support (USAF)

(1) General:

(a) Tactical fighter bombers from the 7th Tactical Air Force were

used to support 2nd Brigade operations. The Forward Air Controllers were from the 19th Tactical Air support Squadron. Night operations were supported by Spooky, Shadow and Moonshine of Bien Hoa Air Force Base.

(b) 2019 fighter sorties were flown by tactical fighters within the Brigade TAOI: 1569 of these strikes were pre-planned sorties. 450 of the strikes were immediate request sorties in support of troops in contact.

(2) The following is the results of the tactical fighter strikes:

Destroyed

Damaged

Uncovered

Bunkers

3056

456

328

Trenches (meters)

3980

1402

2836

Fighting Positions

1304

384

Structures

337

Secondary Explosions

248

Secondary Fires

132

Killed by Air

303 VC (BC)

493 VC (Poss)

d. Chemical Operations:

(1) Chemical operations in support of Operation TOAN THANG II, included

tactical and persistent CS drops, defoliation missions, and “Sniffer” missions flown by the 9th Chemical Detachment in support of the 2nd Bde Operations.

(2) Defoliation missions have been flown in 2nd Bde areas of operations to clear vegetation bordering roads, paths, trails and water-ways (Oriental and Saigon Rivers), thus reducing possible sites from which friendly forces may be ambushed; revealing enemy trails, supply route or installations in forested areas; clearing vegetation from fields of fire and avenues of approach; clearing vegetation surrounding Cu Chi Base Camp and ;other critical installations.

(3) Persistent CS drops from CH-47's have been made in areas of the lower Boi Loi, upper HoBo Woods, and the Cape Canaveral area. Enemy routes of infiltration, trails, LOC's, suspected tunnels and bunker complexes, and suspected rocket launching sites, have been the primary targets of CS drops made in support of 2nd Bde.

(4) Of particular interest was the use of CS in tunnel device operations. The 1 - 5 Infantry (M) encountered large tunnel complexes which were considered too large to be effectively flushed by the Mity-Mite blower. On this situation, 55 gallon drums of CS were made available to the 2nd Bde. The 10 pound sacks of CS were placed inside the tunnel complex spaced about 20 meters apart. All charges and sacks were connected simultaneously. This method sealed the tunnel, trapping the CS inside, effectively denying the tunnel to the enemy.

8. (C) Intelligence:

a. Enemy units during the initial stage of Operation TOAN THANG II were scattered and in a general phase of regrouping. There was sporadic contact, but no indication that he had the ability or resources to launch a major offensive.

b. As the brigade AO enlarged toward the northwest, the movement and positions of the enemy forces became more canalized into the areas of the Filhol, HoBo Woods and the Citadel. Contact with small elements continued, and harassing tactics in the form of mortaring and hit and run attacks were prevalent.

c. During the month of September, stronger, better armed forces were encountered. The majority of contacts were made with local VC forces. There was continuous evidence of resupplying and construction of defensive positions by the enemy. In October, FSB KEENE received a ground attack though not by a force large enough to over-run it. In the Citadel area, there was a coordinated attack on A & D 2 - 12 Inf. between 101800 and 111800. In both cases the enemy did not commit himself in a decisive way. There was evidence of more NVA soldiers making contact, though no main force NVA units could be pin-pointed.

d. In December, the 88th Regiment was identified as a subordinate of SR-2. The area of operations for the 88th was the Citadel - HoBo Woods. The 7th Bn, Cu Chi, was operating in small units and the 268th Regiment was dispersed in the lower Boi Loi Woods.

e. On 11 December, two PW's identified their units as the 268th Regiment and gave a location of XT5333316 (lower Boi Loi Woods). Interrogation indicated that no large scale attacks were planned for the immediate future. In the southern portion of the brigade AO, documents and agent reports indicated the presence of elements of the 267 and 242 battalions. Agent reports and captured documents also indicated that the 272nd Regt was located in the Angel's Wing area; that it had moved south from its previous location west of Tay Ninh. Southeast of this area, along the eastern side of the Oriental River, captured PW's and documents identified the 2642 Bn. Enemy harassment through standoff attacks of mortar and rocket fire throughout the brigade AO was prevalent.

f. On 3 February a PW stated that the local units in Hoc Mon were to assist in the movement of the 101st NVA Regt. towards Saigon, generally following the Saigon River from the Dau Tieng area down through Hoc Mon. Other units identified in early February were the 242 Bn, with its headquarters in Ba Thu, Cambodia, but operating in the Duc Hue area, and continued identification of the 268th Regt. in the Citadel area.

g. At the end of Operation TOAN THANG II, there was still evidence of main force units in the brigade AO. The 268th Regt and the 88th Regt had taken heavy losses, but were receiving replacements from North Vietnam through the Fishhook area. Local Force guerillas, though sustaining continued losses, still had the capability to harass military installations and terrorize many sections of the civilian community. In turn, there were still adequate numbers of civilians who were either neutral or sympathetic to the local forces to permit concealment and resupply.

9. (C) Mission: 2nd Brigade conducts offensive operations in TAOI commencing 1 June 1968 to:

a. Frustrate enemy plans, locate and destroy VC/NVA forces, base camps and support areas.

b. Defend Phu Cuong, Ba Bep and Trang Bang Bridges.

c. Clear and secure MSR's

d. Execute Pacification program (after 25 Oct. “Colors Up”).

e. Conduct VCI operations.

f. Develop targets for B-52 and persistent CS strikes.

g. Conduct combined offensive operations in conjunction with 25th and 5th ARVN Infantry Divisions throughout TAOI to destroy enemy forces.

h. Interdict movement by VC/NVA forces through the TAOI through various corridors by extensive activities within the corridors.

10. (C) Concept of Operation: 2nd Bde in conjunction with the 25th ARVN Div, RF/PF units and National Police, conducted combined and unilateral offensive operations within the TAOI to pre-emtp VC/NVA initiatives, to interdict his lines of communications and to counter enemy initiatives.

11. (C) Execution:

a. The month of June saw daily contact with small enemy units. Almost daily, elements of the 2nd Brigade were locating and destroying small caches, thus maintaining a strong and persistent offensive against the enemy. A major contact was sustained on 17 June vicinity XS7499. Elements of the 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry were located in a night laager which received a main attack by an estimated NVA battalion employing small arms, RPG's, automatic weapons and 60mm mortar fire. Immediately the US troops returned fire with organic weapons, artillery, gunships and a “Spooky”. The NVA Battalion had to withdraw, leaving 67 NVA (BC) and a large amount of enemy weapons, munitions and personal gear.

b. The month of July was characterized by a limited number of contacts with the enemy. The enemy had been defeated during his May offensive, and was generally avoiding major contact throughout the TAOI. On the afternoon of 8 July, Co C, 1st Bn, 27th Infantry, discovered a large cache vic XT799124. The cache contained 238 - 60mm rds, 18 - 82mm rds, 4 boxes of medical supplies, and other assorted small arms ammunition.

c. The month of August was uneventful with respect to actual contact. The enemy was evasive and unwilling to make contact. However, the 2nd Brigade kept the offensive by locating several caches during the period. The 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry, on 4 Aug. located a large munitions cache vic XS645994 in a canal. A thorough search uncovered 17 - 107mm rockets complete, 16 - 75mm RR rds, 22 CHICOM anti-tank mines, and 56 pounds of CHICOM TNT. On 7 Aug 68, another cache was found vic XT747210 which revealed 139 - 75mm RR rds. On still another occasion, on 17 Aug 68, the 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry, vic XT743192 located 3 unusual dirt mounds approximately 2 feet high. A probe into these mounds uprooted 107 RPG-2 rds, 140 - 82mm rds, 23 - 75mm RR rds, 50 - 5ft pieces CHICOM Bangalore torpedoes, 29 CHICOM anti-tank mines, 500 rds, .51cal. ammo, 300 - ¼ blocks CHICOM TNT, and 28,500 rds 7.62 ammunition.

d. The month of September produced no significant contacts. The enemy conducted small unit-size harassing actions. The largest cache of the month was found on 27 September when elements of the 3rd Battalion, 49th ARVN Regiment, supporting the 2nd Brigade, located 104 - 75mm RR rds, 282 - 60mm rds, 281 - 82mm rds, 3 cases of CHICOM grenades, 21 anti-tank mines and 3 cases of AK ammunition.

e. The enemy continued to avoid major contact during the month of October. On 1 October while combat assaulting into the northern HoBo Woods, B and C Companies, 2/12 Infantry, observed five VC running into two tunnels and engaged with organic weapons, LFT, and CS gas. After killing 14 VC and taking 11 VC POW, Co B, 2 / 12 Inf, located a huge cache of the 7th Cu Chi Battalion Rear Detachment. The cache, partially camouflaged, was located vic XT589277 and contained 87 - 82mm rds, 29 cases of RPG-2 rds, 30 cases of AK ammo, 73 bangalore torpedoes, 15 cases 60mm ammo, 7 pistols of assorted types, 1 -60mm mortar, 5 lbs of documents, 66,000 VN piasters, and 1 complete surgical kit. On 10 Oct 68, units from the 2 /12 Inf, 2 /27 Inf and 4 /9 Inf made contact with an estimated battalion sized enemy unit vicinity XT531224 and continued contact until 2000 hrs., resulting in 26VC KIA and 85 VC KIA (poss). Throughout October the 2 /14 Infantry conducted intensive VCI operations within the My Hanh area of Duc Hoa District. The battalion was very successful in destroying the Viet Cong infrastructure in the area. The intense work in this area brought forth many caches and Chieu Hoi's.

During one day, 3 VC's rallied under the Chieu Hoi Program to the battalion. The three ralliers led the 2 /14 Inf to 10 AK-47's, 1 US carbine, 4 RPG-2RL's, 2 RPG-7 rds, and 600 small arms ammo. The following day two more VC rallied to the government at the same location.

(p7)

f. November had several cache finds which usually consisted of large quantities of rice and medical supplies. The major contact of the month took place at 0130 on 28 November 1968. Elements of the 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry, vic XT334151 were engaged by small arms, RPG fire, automatic weapons and 60mm mortar fire. Fire was returned immediately with organic weapons and artillery. The enemy withdrew, leaving 36 VC KIA, 3 CHICOM light machine guns, 2 RPG-2 launchers, 10 AK-47's, 7 RPG-7 launchers and 25 rifle grenades.

g. December started with a large cache discovery by the 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry, vicinity XT613292. The cache contained 128 -82mm rds, 43 cans of charges, 30 RPG-7 rds, and 54 RPG -2 boosters. Numerous light contacts took place during the remainder o the month.

h. During January the enemy avoided contact throughout the TAOI.

i. The 1st Battalion, 5th Infantry (Mechanized), on the 2nd of February, found a

large rice and food cache in vic XT524223: 24,000 lbs of unpolished rice and 20 cans of fish. On Feb, while sweeping through the upper Filhol Plantation, the 2nd Battalion, 34th Armor, discovered a large weapons cache vic XT639218. The following items were found: 50 -122mm rockets, 40 -122mm boosters, 23 -122mm mortars, 20 -107mm rockets, 45 -82mm mortar rds, 43 boxes of C-4, 34 RPG-7 rds, and 5 cases of CHICOM grenades.

j. Detailed summary of execution is attached for periods:

(1) 1 Jun 68 - 30 Sept 68 (Encl. 1)

(2) 1 Oct 68 - 16 Feb 69 (Encl 2)

12. (C) RESULTS:

a. Enemy Losses:

(1) Personnel

VC/NVA KIA (BC)

1797

VC/NVA KIA (Poss)

876

VC/NVA POW

303

Chieu Hoi's

Detainees

1425

(2) Equipment

Captured

Destroyed

Total

Individual Wpns

634

153

787

Crew Served Wpns

128

(3) Munitions:

Captured

Destroyed

Total

122mm Rkts (compt)

122mm Warheads

122mm Rkt Mortar

107mm Rkts Complete

107mm Warheads

120mm Mortar

82mm Mortars

1014

614

1628

82mm Fuses

304

143

447

75RR

283

324

60mm Mortar

649

460

1109

60mm Fuses

150

113

263

57RR

RPG-7 (B-41)

531

257

788

RPG-7 (Boosters)

279

226

505

RPG-2 (B-40)

864

671

1535

RPG-2 (Boosters)

154

134

288

14.5mm MG

100

12.7mm MG

250

.51 Cal

2400

1217

3617

.50 Cal

250

1100

1350

.45 Cal

230

306

9mm

109

157

.38 Cal

150

CHICOM (7.62 Long)

36,450

3770

40,220

7.62 (Short) (AK)

146,433

21,986

168,419

.30

1,100

5,950

7,050

750 lb Bomb

500 lb Bomb

250 lb Bomb

CBU

8” rd

155mm

106mm RR

105mm

4.2 Mortar

90mm (HE)

90mm RR

81mm Mortar

M-72 LAW22

124

AT Mines

147

167

313

AO Mines

Home Made Mines

US Claymore (M-18A1)

CHICOM Directional Mines

Rifle Grenades

108

138

AT Grenades

US Hand Grenades

178

220

CHICOM Hand Grenades

727

846

1573

CHICOM TNT

3181 lbs

2964 lbs

3281 lbs

CHICOM C-3/C-4

2090 lbs

2131 lbs

2303 lbs

Shape Charges

Bangalore Torpedoes

344

112

456

Detonating Cord

120'

Blasting Caps

1206

446

1652

Electrical Wire

3600'

280'

3880'

Time Fuse

200'

Fuse Igniters

234

(4) CONSTRUCTION

Destroyed

Total

Bunkers

4275

Fighting Positions

1706

Tunnels

354

Trench

1180 mtrs

1180

Military Structures

Punji Pits

136

Foot Bridges

Road Blocks

Captured Destroyed Total

(5) Documents 265 lbs 265 lbs

(6) Supplies:

Captured

Destroyed

Total

Medical Supplies

172 lbs

VC/NVA Uniforms

122

209

VC/NVA Webgear

US Pistol Belt

VC Ponchos

155

177

272

VC/NVA Helmets

VC/NVA Gasmasks

VC/NVA Hammocks

124

278

402

VC/NVA misc. clothing

102

Sandals

45pr

57pr

102pr

VC/NVA Canteens

110

527

627

VC/NVA Medical Bags

VC/NVA Entrenching tools

VC/NVA Picks

Machetes

115

Knives

Flashlights

Flashlight Batteries

109

121

AK Magazines

186

101

287

RPD Drums

121

Military Radios

Civilian Radios

Antenna

Field Phones

Commo Wire

3100'

2735'

5835'

Sampans

117

Sampan Motors

Bicycles

Motor-scooters

Automobiles

Piasters (GVN)

77,831$

Rice

183,230 lbs

21,729 lbs

304,959lbs

Fish

41 cans

Salt

3750 lbs

1100 lbs

3850 lbs

Peanuts

100 lbs

250 lbs

350 lbs

Cooking Oil

50 gals

Condensed Milk

200 cans

Cooking Utensils

12 lbs

17 lbs

29 lbs

Stoves

Sewing Machines

Typewriters

Tobacco

750 lbs

Carbide lamps

(7) Miscellaneous, Captured:

12 aiming stakes

3 60mm mortar sights

1 loudspeaker

3 60mm mortar baseplates

40 cartons VN cigarettes

1 82mm mortar baseplate

2 watches

2 US compasses

3 snorkels

4 inner-tubes

2 RPG-7 sights

1 50 cal. MG Tripod

2 pr binoculars

1 Tape Recorder

1400' nylon rope

200 lbs surgical soap

2 letters

4 PRC 25 batteries

2 VC flags

2 NVA flags

1 Russian flag

1 60mm mortar cleaning kit

1 2 ½ HP generator

1 3HP engine

30' claymore wire

50 fishing poles

b. US Casualties:

KIA

WIA

TOTAL

1 -5 Inf (M)

234

273

1 -27 Inf

123

2 -12 Inf

242

286

2 -14 Inf

259

291

2 -27 Inf

308

365

2 -34 Armor

3 -4 Cav

102

3 -22 Inf

3 -187 Inf

4 -9 Inf

135

155

2 -3 Inf

3 -17 CAV

C/65 Engr

1 -8 Arty

a. Supply: During the reporting period the supply point distribution system was

in effect for all major units. The supply points were located at the base camp from which major units drew all major items of equipment and supplies. Major units made unit distribution to their subordinate elements whenever it was practical. On some occasions, major units also employed the supply point distribution system. The resupply methods used during the period included transporting supplies from the base camp to a forward field location (fire support base) and subsequently to a forward position, i.e., night laager, hard-spot and patrol base. Supplies are normally moved by surface from the base camp to the forward field location except for combat emergencies and to locations not accessible by road. Aerial resupply is conducted utilizing the CH-47 and the UH-1D. With the CH-47, loads are carried both internally and externally. Air assets are limited and difficult to obtain at times. Therefore, every effort should be made to move supplies by surface means whenever practical.

During this period the basic problem consisted of a shortage of barrier and fortification materials. These shortages included concertina wire, sandbags and heavy timber required for establishing overnight defensive positions. Assault troops carried more than a basic load of ammunition which consisted of the normal combat load plus the individual and crew-served weapons load. The additional ammunition requirements created a resupply problem. In most cases, combat resupply was accomplished by CH-47 or UH-1D. On several occasions there was a shortage of claymore mines with detonating devices, trip flares and 40mm (M79) ammunition. Resupply has been hampered to some degree by a shortage of air rigging equipment which has a serviceab8lity span of six (6) months.

b. Maintenance: Maintenance operations and support during the period have fluctuated from fair to good. The major problem has been in the area of repair parts availability. Several combat essential items, i.e., PRC-25/77 radios, 90mm Recoilless Rifles, 81mm mortars, 4.2 inch mortars, mine detectors, and starlight scopes were dead-lined in excess of 30 days due to parts.

c. Treatment of Casualties and Evacuation: Adequate evacuation of casualties was provided by the 159th Medical Detachment during Phase II. During major contacts with the enemy, the 159th Medical Detachment was supplemented by other helicopter medical detachments to handle the large casualty requirements. The 2nd Brigade casualties were speedily evacuated to the medical facilities that had the capability of treating the type of wound involved.

d. Transportation: Organic wheeled vehicles were used to resupply fire support bases. During company sized or larger unit moves, non-organic vehicles were required. The major problems in this area were dead-lined vehicles without seats and side boards which decreased the unit transportation availability and capability considerably. Also, mines were a great and continuous threat to surface transportation. Air transportation assets are limited and were used only when requirements could not be met by surface means. Due to the heavy commitment of Army Aviation support, aerial resupply could not always be satisfied on a timely basis.

e. Communications:

(1) KY-8 Operation: Voltage required for the KY-8 is 25 volts. Field CP

arrangements have used a 24 Voltage battery in conjunction with a 28V Generator. In order to insure 25 Volts for the KY-8, 30 Volt battery service is necessary and will eliminate unsatisfactory secure voice operation.

(2) AN/PRC-25 Long Antenna, AT-271: There has been a tendency to throw away the Long Antenna AT-271 when the nylon cord breaks. The antenna can be saved by using field wire WDO1 as a substitute.

(3) Antenna R-292: Improved Communications has been achieved by the proper construction of the 292 Antenna when erected to comply with the frequency ranges the Antenna has been designed for. Mutual interference has been eliminated when antennas were properly erected.

14. Special Equipment and Techniques:

a. Scout and Tracker dogs were used extensively throughout the reporting

Period. The employment of the scout dogs was mostly at night with platoon and section size ambush patrols. This technique proved to be very effective because of the dog's ability to alert possible VC/NVA movement or ambush sites. Scout dogs were also employed during daylight RIF's on the point. The utilization of scout dogs on the point was very effective in detecting booby traps or possible VC tunnels if the VC had been in the area within a two day time period. Tracker dogs were used extensively after contacts for the purpose of tracking wounded VC/NVA and along routes of withdrawal for possible VC/NVA sanctuaries.

b. During the period 20 - 29 January 1969, one of the maneuver battalions conducted airboat operations in and along swamp areas which consisted of the following: Reconnaissance in force, search operations and resources control. The purpose of the operation was to destroy VC/NVA forces, interdict movement and uncover supply caches. The operation proved to be successful and essential. The assignment of assets to a unit responsible for swamp areas would be invaluable. Some of the problems encountered were communication between craft and with higher elements, and navigational problems without an aircraft overhead for command and control purposes. The inability of the Airboats to operate at night because of the lack of a high intensity light system hampered the operations considerably.

c. During the reporting period, two Riverine operations were conducted. Concept of operations was to provide a ground reaction force to exploit contacts initiated by the US Navy between time periods of 1600 - 2400 hours. Upon contact, the US Navy was to maintain the contact until the infantry could be employed on or near the point of contact, either by air or by ATC's. Contact was made a total of five (5) times during both operations. Problem areas encountered were numerous. Artillery coverage was very inadequate at times due to the locations of the FSB's supporting the operations. Ground forces were unable to operate due to the terrain preventing rapid movement, especially during hours of darkness. Contacts were very short and a definite target could not be pinpointed for the employment of the ground forces.

d. Joint operations were conducted throughout Operation TOAN THANG, Phase II with RF/PF units and ARVN Battalions. Joint operations with the RF/PF was conducted utilizing combined forces on ambush patrols and local security RIF's. Combined operations were also conducted utilizing the CRIP and Recon platoons of all maneuver elements with the RF/PF forces. The combined operations with the RF/PF forces proved very effective and created a better relationship between RF/PF and US forces. The ARVN battalions and US battalion size elements conducted joint operations consisting of cordon and search of villages and hamlets, combat assaults into areas for search and clear, and reconnaissance in force type missions. These operations were very successful in eliminating VC/NVA forces within numerous villages and hamlets and areas in close proximity thereof. This type of operation was beneficial to both forces, in that it gave both the US and ARVN Forces the chance to observe the techniques and tactics used by both forces on the combined operations.