OP Gadsden

On D-2 the 4/23 (M) Inf moved from CU CHI to SOUI DA (XT346582) and conducted Deception Operations. On D-1 the 2/22 (M) Inf, the 2/77 Arty and the 3d Bde command group moved to TRAI BI (XT115705) and established a Bde Base. On D-Day the 2/22 (M) Inf conducted S&D operations from vic XT1171 to vic XT0678. The 2/12 Inf was airlifted from DAU TIENG to TRAI BI. The 4/23 (M) Inf continued deception Operations vic SOUI DA. The 1/31 Inf conducted an airmobile assault vic XT55684. The 175th Engineer Co installed a bridge at that location, and the 1/5 (M) Inf moved across the bridge and conducted S&D opns to secure obj 2 (XT034717). Elements of the 4/31 Inf and the 3/82 Arty were then helilifted to obj 2. On D+1 the 2/1 Inf was helilifted to obj 4 (WT981700). The 1/5 (M) conducted S&D opns to obj 4, secured LZ's for the 2/1 Inf. The 1/5 Inf (M) encountered AT mines and RPG-2 fire along the routes of its advance. Vic WT999699 the Recon Plt was engaged by an est 15 - 20 VC. Co B reinforced the platoon. Arty and gunships provided support. VC losses were 3 (BC) and 1 (poss). The 2/22 (M) Inf secured obj 1 (XT035740) and moved to obj 3 (WT975949). The 4/23 (M) Inf moved from SOUI DA to obj 1.

On D+2 the 4/31 Inf conducted S&D opn to obj 5 (XT010687). The 2/1 Inf was hit by a mortar attack vic (WT976697). VC used 82mm mortar firing 30 rds. The 2/12 Inf was helilifted to obj 2 (XT11711). The 4/23 (M) Inf moved from obj 1 to FSB Charlie (XT015724). Other units conducted local S&D opns. In a delayed report Co A 2/22 (M) Inf captured large stocks of food and destroyed numerous bicycles, tires, and parts vic (WT983775).

On D+3 the 1/5 (M) Inf moved to obj 6 (WT992665). Co A engaged a large force of VC vic (WT983666). VC were armed with SA, AW and rifle grenades. US used SA, AW and Arty. VC losses were 15 VC (BC), 1 M79, 1 Chicom type 57 MG, 2 AK-47 rifles and 2 Chicom carbines captured. Other units conducted local S&D opns. Co B 2/22 (M) Inf destroyed 9 tons of rice, 3000 lbs of food stuffs, and captured 70 tons of rice vic (WT967762). Co A 4/23 (M) Inf was engaged by a VC force of unknown size vic (XT0120714). Fire was returned with SA, AW and Arty resulting in 11 VC (BC).

On D+4 the units established blocking positions and conducted local S&D opns. Units continued to destroy large amounts of food, bunkers and structures, and captured numerous weapons, communication equipment, mines and explosives, numerous small clashes with small groups of VC continued.

On 6 Feb Co's A and C 1/5 (M) Inf engaged an est VC platoon vic (WT977667). Arty, airstrikes and gunships were employed in support. VC losses were 21 (BC). On 6 Feb HQ 4/23 (M) Inf destroyed a large VC base camp vic (WT977735). On 7 Feb Co C 2/1 Inf destroyed a VC training area vic (WT995670).

On 12 Feb the 2/1 Inf helilifted to FSB DELTA (XT036649). The 1/5 (M) Inf secured FSB DELTA and conducted S&D opns to obj 7 (WT984615). The 2/12 Inf conducted S&D opns to obj C (XT006753). The 4/23 (M) Inf conducted S&D opns to obj 1 (XT030785), linked up with the 4/9 Inf, and conducted S&D opns to obj 2 (XT015810), Co B 2/22 (M) Inf captured a large supply of Chicom radios, field phones, generators, radio parts, antenna and batteries vic (WT967764). The 4/9 Inf conducted an airmobile assault and secured obj 1 (XT037785). Co A 4/23 (M) Inf captured 1 VC PW vic (XT012819).

On 13 Feb the 4/31 Inf moved to FSB DELTA (XT036649). Co C 1/5 (M) Inf destroyed a large food and ammunition supply vic (WT986624). The 2/22 (M) Inf moved to obj B (WT9679). The 2/12 moved to blocking positions vic (WT9977). The 4/23 (M) Inf moved to obj E (WT9982). Co A 2/12 Inf captured 6790 rds of SA ammo vic (WT996776).

On 14 Feb the 2/1 Inf conducted S&D opns to obj 8 (XT0559). The 1/5 (M) Inf conducted S&D opns to vic (XT0256) and established fwd base. The 2/22 (M) Inf conducted S&D opns to (WT9780), linked up with the 2/12 Inf and continued S&D opns to vic obj 1 (XT0278). The 4/23 (M) Inf conducted opns to obj 1. An APC of Co C 1/5 (M) Inf was hit by 10 rds of 60mm fire. Co A and C 1/5 (M) Inf each received 8 rds of 60nn fire. The 4/31 Inf returned to TAY NINH. .

Officially classified as a search and destroy operation, GADSDEN employed two brigades of the U.S. 25th Infantry Division under the command of Major General Frederick C. Weyand. Involved were the 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, commanded by Colonel Marshall B. Garth, and the 196th Light Infantry Brigade, Brigadier General Richard T. Knowles commanding.

The GADSDEN area of operation was some thirty kilometers northwest of Tay Ninh, in the vicinity of Lo Go and Xom Gina, South Vietnamese villages on the Cambodian border. (Map 9) The terrain is generally flat and the vegetation ranges from rice fields to triple-canopy jungle. During the operation grasslands in the area were as tall as six feet. There was some heavy mud in paddy areas, but most of the previously flooded positions had dried, thus facilitating overland movement. Weather was favorable for the operation.

Before the operation it was suspected that elements of the 271st and 272d Viet Cong Regiments, 70th Guard Regiment, 680th Training Regiment, and miscellaneous elements subordinate to the Central Office of South Vietnam-including several medical units-might be encountered. According to intelligence sources, Lo Go was a major supply center of the Viet Cong forces where shipments from Cambodia were transferred to local units. Therefore, the area of operation was believed to contain extensive supply and ammunition caches, communications storage areas, hospital facilities, base camps, and major training complexes. In addition, personnel and supply routes to and from Cambodia were expected to be found.

The plans stipulated that Operation GADSDEN be conducted in several phases. During Phase I, forces would be positioned for the attack with combat elements established as close to the operational area as Trai Bi. Phase II, starting on D-day, would include a two-brigade attack to the west to seize two intermediate objectives, secure landing zones, and establish fire support bases. This would be followed by attacks on Lo Go and Xom Giua. Other objectives would be designated later. Search and destroy missions would be conducted in the zone, and blocking positions would be established to seal infiltration and exfiltration routes along the border during Phase III. During the last phase the units would expand the area of operation to the southeast to search for and destroy enemy forces and base camps.

Using a combination of airmobile assaults and attacks by mechanized battalions, the operation went as planned. During the 20-day duration of GADSDEN, the fighting was typified by small unit actions. Even though the fortifications encountered were extensive and many were capable of withstanding very heavy artillery and air strikes, the enemy chose not to stand and fight but rather to employ guerrilla tactics.

Evidence was uncovered to confirm that in the operational area were located a training area for main force Viet Cong units which included an obstacle course and an elaborate land navigation course; a rest and recuperation center including numerous medical facilities and supplies, as well as a 100-gallon still with 2,000 gallons of mash and 50 bottles of alcohol; an ordnance facility for fabricating and storing bombs, artillery rounds, and grenades; and numerous caches of food and other material. Also identified in the area were the postal transportation section, the current affairs section, and the military staff directorate of the Central Office of South Vietnam. Captured documents and ralliers identified elements of the 3d Battalion? 271st Viet Cong Regiment; the 3d Battalion, 70th Viet Cong Regiment; the 680th Training Regiment; and a medical unit subordinate to the Central Office.

In addition to confirming the location of various units and installations in the area, GADSDEN inflicted some fairly significant losses upon the enemy. His casualties totaled at least 161 killed and 2 captured. He lost 26 weapons, 390 tons of rice (of which 50 percent was evacuated), salt, sugar, tea, soap, cigarettes, and 550 pounds of documents. Five hundred fifty huts, 590 bunkers, and 28 sampans were destroyed, as were numerous items of explosives and ammunition. U.S. battle losses were 29 killed and 107 wounded.

GADSDEN also accomplished its primary mission of positioning troops and supplies for JUNCTION CITY. The chances of success for that operation were bolstered by the opinion expressed by Colonel Garth: "GADSDEN proved the ability of mechanized units to operate in heavily vegetated terrain and that U.S. forces have the capability of moving at their desire within War Zone C."